Abstract I analyze a model of electoral competition in which a candidate's reputation and his need of credibility restricts his policy choice to a certain subset of the policy space, its ideology set. Candidates are o¢ ce-motivated. They care about winning and also about the share of votes they get. I consider both two and three party systems. I describe the equilibrium outcomes assuming that plurality rule applies, and obtain for two party competition, in some cases, equilibrium outcomes di¤erent than what the median voter theorem suggests because of the restrictions on the ideology sets implied by the credibility constraints. I show that centrist parties are disadvantaged compared to leftist and rightist ones, since, in equilibrium, leftist and rightist parties choose policy points that are as close as possible to each other and obtain votes from the centrist parties'ideology set. A centrist candidate needs a higher concentration of voters in his credibility set compared to his opponents in order to have a chance to win. I also analyze a run-o¤ system for three parties and show that centrist parties have more opportunities to win under this rule than under plurality rule.
Introduction
In the last decades, it has been argued that the political view of society members (voters) has smoothened compared to the past and that most people would de…ne themselves to be more centrist. A study conducted by CIS in Spain shows that the response to the question "In politics it is being talked about left and right. On a scale where 0 is left and 10 is right where would you put yourself?" had a mean of 4.56 in 1997 and 4.32 in 2005. Moreover, in 1997 51.3% of the people who answered the question located themselves between 4 and 6, that is, the very center of the political spectrum. Blais and Bodet (2006) report the results for a similar question for 21 countries and 31 elections and …nd that except for two countries (Germany and Israel) the median voter is located at the midpoint. Although this …nding does not include the exact density around the center it can be argued that it shows the necessary condition to be able to talk about the importance of the center which is that the median voter should necessarily be located in the center. Considering this aspect, one should expect that centrist parties should have encountered an increasing advantage to win elections. Daalder (1984) states that the idea of de…ning themselves as centrist parties has been considered attractive by politicians. Duverger (1964) argues however, that "although the "Centre" is the main force of the parliamentary life", that is, although the majority of voters are located ideologically close to the very center of the political spectrum, the electoral system favors ideologically leftist or rightist parties. This paper intends to show the conditions under which one could think that Duverger's statement applies by analyzing a three candidate electoral competition model, and by arguing that plurality rule is an electoral system that favors leftist and rightist parties whereas a centrist candidate would have more chances of winning under a run-o¤ rule than under plurality rule.
One of the main features of our analysis is the consideration of credibility constraints. In the real world electoral competition, it is a rather rare situation that candidates can choose their policy or campaigning points among all the hypothetically possible ones. Normally we see that candidates face restrictions over the sets of policies that they can propose as campaign promises. Furthermore, one can observe that the set of policies that are credible for one candidate usually does not coincide with the set of policies that are credible for a di¤erent candidate. In order to formalize this observation, in this paper I will assume that each candidate (or party) will be able to choose its policy point from a certain subset of the whole interval of policy points. In a one dimensional policy space, the strategy set of a candidate, that is, the subset of the policy space from which a candidate can choose a policy point that would be considered as credible by the voters would simply be an interval of the policy line. It can be argued that, the larger the interval of a candidate, the higher is the credibility that he has among the voters.
Think about parties or candidates that have been competing for a certain number of elections. A party having claimed or acted for a long period to be ideologically leftist would lose its credibility if it were to state that from now on it were to follow a rightist point of view. Alesina (1988) states that candidates obtain credibility through reputation in an in…nitely repeated game. This reputation, for a party that wins the election, makes deviations from the announced policy point to another policy which is preferred by the party too costly. This result, I believe, could be considered as a justi…cation for the assumption that I will follow in terms of the permissible intervals. It is assumed that competing candidates have a history of past competition, and the speci…ed intervals de…ne the limit points of policy announcements that would be considered as credible by voters.
I consider an electoral competition where candidates have a history of policy choices. This history de…nes them ideologically as leftist, rightist or centrist. In my framework, one could say that "Voters discipline candidates by believing some promises a candidate makes as long as" 1 these promises coincide with the set of promises that voters accept as credible in terms of the ideological statements of the candidates. That is, the intervals of acceptable policy points for each ideology are de…ned as the sets of policy points that voters consider credible given the party´s history of policy choices. Aragones et al. (2005) show that in a repeated electoral competition where voters can punish candidates, parties can credibly commit to policy points which belong to an interval around their ideal points. Taking this result as granted, I assume in my model that these intervals are exogenously determined considering that candidates already have a history of past choices.
Casamatta and De Donder (2005) also consider exogenously given credibility intervals, which are symmetric around the ideal points of the candidates. These intervals do not intersect and each candidate's interval has the same length. Di¤erent than my model, they assume that candidates care only about the policy implemented by the winner. They analyze equilibrium outcomes under plurality rule and proportional representation for two and four candidate electoral competitions. Under plurality rule they obtain that the introduction of extreme parties causes that the centrist parties choose either the same policy point under two parties or more extreme ones. Di¤erent than their …nding, I obtain that the policy point decision of the centrist candidate depends only on the distribution of ideal points of voters.
Samuelson (1984) constructs a model of two candidate electoral competition under probabilistic voting
where candidates are restricted to choose their strategies close to their initial points, which are a product of previous political activity, in order not to loose credibility. Rather than taking the credibility sets as exogenously given he assumes that they are an endogenous function of candidates'initial points. He obtains that, di¤erent than the median voter theorem suggests, in equilibrium it is not always the case that the two candidates tie.
Another important feature of the model presented here can be found in the de…nition of the payo¤ function of the candidates. Stating that candidates care only about winning does not seem to be su¢ cient to explain real-world electoral competition phenomena. Neglecting the e¤ect of the share of votes a candidate gets, would lead to unreasonable interpretations. It would mean that candidates with no chance of winning would never enter the competition. However, in many situations there exist candidates or parties who continue to compete despite the fact that they have no chance of winning.
These observations seem to imply that a reasonable candidate utility function should include the share of votes as an argument. Therefore, I will include also the shares of votes they get into the utility function of the candidates. One can consider that the higher its share of votes, the higher is the funding that a candidate obtains from outside. Since outside funding is one of the vital sources that help parties to survive, this is an important aspect to be considered given that in real world parties compete during several elections. Moreover, as Osborne (1993) argues, entering the competition might be useful for a candidate even if he loses as it might increase their credibility. It can be argued that the higher the share of votes of a candidate the higher his credibility would be in further elections. In the following analysis I do not consider repeated elections. I analyze only one period electoral competition under plurality rule and run-o¤ rule but this analysis helps to have an insight on real world electoral competition where parties compete for repeated elections.
I consider an electoral competition on a one dimensional policy space, where voters vote sincerely, with no abstention, and where each candidate can choose its policy point from a given subset of the whole policy space. Candidates possess full information about the distribution of ideal points of voters.
I …rst consider a one-round electoral system and analyze the characteristics of the equilibrium outcomes for di¤erent credibility sets for two (leftist and rightist) and three candidate (leftist, rightist and centrist)
elections. I assume that the winner is determined by plurality rule. I analyze the equilibrium outcomes, under di¤erent speci…cations for the intervals from which candidates can choose their policy points. Cox (1987) shows that for a uniform distribution of voters, for candidates which are plurality maximizers, and for odd numbers of candidates (n) with n 3, there exists no Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. In fact, for three candidate competition he shows that there exist no equilibrium for a general distribution under plurality rule when candidates are either plurality maximizers or complete plurality maximizers or share maximizers. This result would also hold for a utility function of candidates de…ned as in my model, if candidates do not face any credibility constraints.
In order to ensure the existence of an equilibrium in all cases, I maintain two assumptions on voters'
behavior. The …rst assumption, which I maintain for both two and three candidate electoral competition, characterizes the behavior of voters when two candidates choose the same policy point. It states that voters do not consider as identical, candidates who are located on the same policy point. This could be considered as a natural behavior since voters discipline candidates by believing only those policy announcements that belong to a certain subset of the whole policy space. So, if two candidates have di¤erent credible policy sets, voters would perceive them as di¤erent even if they announce the same policy point.
For three candidate competition, under this assumption, I can guarantee the existence of an equilibrium for the cases where the intervals of the three candidates intersect only at a single point. If the intervals overlap, then for some parameter values this assumption can not guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. Therefore, in this case I use a second assumption on voters' behavior. The second assumption I make characterizes the behavior of voters when the centrist candidate is located to the left of the leftist candidate or to the right of the rightist candidate. I assume that, in these two cases, the centrist candidate gets no votes. This behavior could be considered as a punishment applied by voters for a centrist candidate who chooses to be more leftist than the leftist candidate or to be more rightist than the rightist candidate.
The main result for two candidate electoral competition is that certain restrictions on intervals, such that the median voter's ideal point is located in the interval of at most one candidate, cause that candidates choose policy points di¤erent than the location of the median voter which might coincide or not depend on the exact characteristics of the intervals. Therefore, in these cases the outcome is not the same as it is suggested by the median voter theorem, which states that, in equilibrium, both candidates are located at the ideal point of the median voter. Otherwise, the results coincide with the predictions of the median voter theorem.
For the three candidate electoral competition, I show that in equilibrium the centrist candidate is disadvantaged compared to the other two candidates, that is, he is less likely to win. I describe the conditions under which a centrist candidate wins. I show also that since candidates are assumed to be o¢ ce-motivated, leftist and rightist candidates prefer to converge to each other as much as their credibility constraints allow. The centrist candidate wins when his opponents face small credibility sets and when the share of voters with ideal points in his credibility set is fairly high. When the centrist candidate cannot win, in many cases his policy choice determines the winner.
Having shown that a centrist candidate faces disadvantages under plurality rule, the next step would be to argue whether this also holds for di¤erent election rules. I consider a run-o¤ rule under the two assumptions mentioned above and show that the run-o¤ rule can be more advantageous for centrist candidates. That is, the centrist candidate can win for larger credibility sets of his opponents compared 
Model
The model that I set up follows the classical analysis of Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957 
Game
The game consists of a one period electoral competition. There is a …xed number of candidates 3 and a continuum of voters. Candidates declare their policy points simultaneously before the election and full-commitment is assumed. Each candidate can credibly commit to a policy as long as it belongs to a speci…ed subset of the policy space. We assume that a non-credible strategy is always dominated by a credible one, and therefore, we consider only credible strategies as potential equilibrium strategies.
Thus, the relevant strategy set for a candidate will be de…ned as a particular subset of the interval. The solution concept used is Nash equilibrium. The outcome of the game is the winner of the election who is determined by plurality rule, that is, the candidate who gets the highest amount of votes is the winner, or by a run-o¤ rule. In the case of a tie, as a tie breaking rule, I assume that each candidate sharing the highest percentage of votes will have the same probability of winning. ). Before the election, all candidates declare their policy choices. The policy point chosen by the leftist candidate is denoted as x L ; the policy point chosen by the centrist candidate as x C , and the one of the rightist candidate is denoted as x R : The utility function (U j ) of candidates has the following lexicographic form: 
Voters
For the whole analysis, I assume that there is a continuum of voters who have single-peaked preferences Moreover, I exclude the possibility of abstention by thinking of a law making voting obligatory where the penalty outweighs the cost of voting (or it could be assumed that voting has no cost). I assume that voters vote sincerely, which could also be thought as a situation in which voters do not posses any information regarding neither the distribution of voters nor of the median voter 4 . Voters are not strategic players of the game since sincere voting is assumed.
For the following analysis it will be assumed that candidates possess complete information about the distribution of the voters. Throughout the whole analysis, I denote the ideal point of the median voter as m. For the case of two candidates, a candidate has to get more votes than his opponent in order to win.
Restricted Electoral Competition With Two Candidates
Moreover, since the share of votes a¤ects the utility of candidates, the candidates want to win with the highest share of votes possible. Since all voters vote, maximizing plurality is strategically equivalent to maximizing share of votes, satisfying the su¢ cient conditions of the equivalence theorem of Aranson et al. (1974) .
As the intervals of both candidates may intersect or even overlap, it is possible that in equilibrium, they announce the same policy point. However, voters perceive the candidates as ideologically di¤erent and, therefore, when both candidates choose the same policy point, the following assumption on voters' behavior will be made: This assumption could be considered as a tie-breaking rule for the voters. For some cases, without Assumption 1 there would not exist an equilibrium. 5 Throughout this section I assume that voters behave as Assumption 1 suggests.
For a = 1 2 , the results are as follows: . Then
is a strictly dominant strategy for R. Then, the best response of L would be x L = is a strictly dominant strategy for L and therefore, there exists an equilibrium. In general, Assumption 1 guarantees an equilibrium where the best response of a candidate would be to be located at an distance from his opponent without this assumption.
case, s R = s L = 1 2 and they win with equal probability as a result of the tie breaking rule. If L deviates to x L < 1 2 he would decrease s L which would lead to s R > s L making R the winner. If R deviates to x R > 1 2 he would decrease s R which would lead to s R < s L making L the winner. Therefore, they have no incentives to deviate and x L = x R = 1 2 constitutes the equilibrium. # Proposition 1 states that in equilibrium both candidates will locate themselves at the same policy point meaning that there can not be any di¤erentiation between leftist and rightist points of view. As ii.
iii.
Therefore, in equilibrium x L = x R = a and R wins for sure since 
Restricted Electoral Competition With Three Candidates
In this section I analyze the same type of electoral competition as above but now I consider three candidates, that is, a centrist candidate is introduced. The partition of the policy space is such that the leftist candidate can choose a policy point from the interval [0; a], with 0 < a < 1, the centrist candidate For this cases, I assume that voters behave as the following assumption suggests.
, then all voters with x i < x L vote for the leftist candidate while all voters with (x R + x C ) =2 > x i > x L vote for the centrist candidate. Similarly, if x R = x C , then all voters with x i > x R vote for the rightist candidate while all voters with (x L + x C ) =2 < x i < x R vote for the centrist candidate.
As in the previous section, this assumption could be considered as a tie-breaking rule for the voters.
For some cases, without this assumption there does not exist an equilibrium. 6 Throughout the whole analysis that follows, I assume that voters behave as Assumption 1.1 suggests.
As opposed to the case for two candidates where maximizing the probability of winning is strategically equivalent to maximizing the share of votes, for three candidates as Osborne (1995) argues these two strategies that correspond to these two objectives do not need to coincide. That is, a candidate who would win may increase his share of votes by locating himself closer to one of his opponents and thereby increasing the share of votes of his other opponent that much so that he can not win any more. To visualize this situation, consider the following example: Suppose that the interval for the leftist, centrist and rightist candidates are 0; 3 ; 1 respectively. During the following analysis, Assumption 1.1 will be maintained. Therefore, choosing 6 Consider intervals with a = b and a distribution of ideal points with m < a whose density function is strictly decreasing for policy points greater than a. In that case, x C = a is a strictly dominant strategy for the centrist candidate. Then, the best response of the leftist candidate would be x L = a with > 0 and close to 0. So, there exists no equilibrium. (Notice that x R would be equal to 1 a)
3 is a strictly dominant strategy for L and R respectively. From the above density function it can easily be concluded that a share-maximizing centrist candidate would locate himself at
. Doing so, the share of votes each candidate gets will be s L = 0:222, s C = 0:381, s R = 0:397 where the rightist candidate will be the winner. If, however, the centrist candidate locates himself at
, then clearly the share of votes of the leftist candidate will increase while the share of votes of the rightist and centrist candidates will decrease. In fact, they take the following values:
s L = 0:329, s C = 0:35, s R = 0:321, meaning that the centrist candidate is the winner. So, the centrist candidate not being able to win the election with the highest share of votes possible, can achieve this aim with a lower share of votes by re-locating himself.
Therefore, the optimal strategy of a candidate that cares about winning under plurality does not need to coincide with the strategy that maximizes his share of votes. His optimal strategy is the one that makes him obtain the highest possible share of votes such that it is higher than the share of votes of all his opponents. Only a candidate that can never win, to maximize his utility, will simply choose the policy point which maximizes his share of votes.
Connected Intervals (a = b)
In this section, I analyze a situation where the intervals' intersection consists only of a single point, c . Then the share of votes each candidate gets will be as follows:
Therefore, in order to win the centrist candidate will choose x C such that it satis…es:
x C = arg max
That is, the centrist candidate knowing the equilibrium strategies of the rightist and leftist candidates will try to maximize his share of votes given that he wins. If the above maximization problem has no solution, he will try to win at least with some probability that is, he will face the above maximization problem with weak inequality(ies) for one of the two constraints or both. If it has no solution, then the centrist candidate will choose x C such that it satis…es:
x C = arg max The best responses of the leftist and rightist candidates are As before, the best responses of the leftist and rightist candidates are As before, the best responses of the leftist and rightist candidates are at least one of these two candidates obtains a share of votes larger than 2 ) and R and L with equal probability if x C = 1 2 . Proof: As before, choosing x L = a, x R = 1 a is a strictly dominant strategy for L and R respectively. For any choice of policy point of C, s C = 1 2a
i.e. if x C > 3a. So, C wins for sure choosing x C 2 (3a; 1 3a) which can only be a valid interval if a < 
The conclusion that can be drawn is that, with intervals intersecting at a single point the centrist candidate can only win if the leftist and rightist candidates are forced to be polarized.
Disconnected Intervals (b > a)
Now I consider credible policy sets with b > a, that is, the intervals of the candidates do not intersect. , and x C = 1 2 , in equilibrium, the leftist and rightist candidates win with equal probability. If a = 
i.e. if x C < 1 3a. If he locates himself to the left of
i.e. if x C > 3a . (3a; 1 3a) is a valid interval only if a < = s C . From the tie-breaking rule, L and R win with equal probability. If
The results are very similar to the ones of Proposition 5. The critical value, that makes the centrist candidate the winner is the same, namely 1 6 . The only di¤erence is that, if we consider the same value of a for both cases, since in the case at hand b > a, whether he wins or not, the interval in which the centrist candidate can locate himself is smaller than it is in Section 5.1 leaving him with a smaller set of choice.
Intervals Overlapping with Neighbors
In the above analysis the intervals for the leftist and centrist candidates and the intervals for the rightist and centrist candidates were intersecting only at a single point or not at all. Now, I analyze the case where the intervals for the rightist and centrist candidates and the intervals for the leftist and centrist candidate overlap whereas the intervals of the leftist and rightist candidate do not intersect. That is, In the previous two cases the credible policy sets were such that the centrist candidate would choose for sure a policy point to the right of the leftist candidate and to the left of the rightist candidate. In the case at hand, however, the centrist candidate can locate himself to the left of the leftist candidate or to the right of the rightist candidate. For such a choice, he could not be considered as the centrist candidate anymore being more leftist than the leftist or more rightist than the rightist candidate. Therefore, the following assumption will be made:
then the centrist candidate gets no votes.
This assumption states that voters punish the centrist candidate by giving him no votes if he chooses to be more leftist or more rightist than the corresponding candidate. That is, although voters consider some policy choices as credible claims proposed by two di¤erent candidates, they still force candidates to locate themselves according their ideological labels. I assume for the whole section that voters behave as Assumption 2 suggests. Without this assumption, there would exist no equilibrium for a uniform distribution of ideal points of voters if a > 6 and x C = 1 2 the leftist and rightist candidates win with equal probability. Proof: In equilibrium, x L = a, and x R = 1 a as they are strictly dominant strategies. s C = 0 if
i.e. if x C > 3a. So, C wins for sure choosing x C 2 (3a; 1 3a) which can only be a valid interval if a < , any x C 2 [a; 1 a] could be included as an equilibrium strategy.
so that L is the winner.
2 . From the tie-breaking rule, L and R win with equal probability. #
The conclusion that can be drawn from the above result is that if the centrist candidate is required to locate himself to the right of the leftist candidate and to the left of the rightist candidate, the results are the same whether the intervals overlap or only intersect at a single point. Moreover, the interval of the centrist candidate does not play a role. The only parameter that a¤ects the outcome is, a, the one that speci…es the intervals of the leftist and rightist candidates.
Intervals
Overlapping with all Opponents ( Therefore, for an arbitrary distribution of ideal points a similar argument to Proposition 9 would also hold for this case. Since a The above result shows that in equilibrium there is only place for two parties, namely the leftist and rightist one. It can be said that in a society where the label of being "leftist" or "rightist" plays an important role "we arrive at the paradoxical situation that the Centre in ‡uences the whole of parliamentary life in the very country in which the electoral system prevents the formation of a Centre party." 8 
Discussion of the Results
In the analysis above the equilibrium outcomes are described for di¤erent credibility sets of candidates, which cover all the possibilities. What do these outcomes have in common? In all cases, for leftist and rightist candidates, it is a strictly dominant strategy to choose the policy point that is the most centrist one of their credibility sets. Therefore, the choice of the centrist candidate is the result of the maximization of his utility taking these strictly dominant strategies into account.
The winner depends heavily on the distribution of voters'ideal points. The leftist or rightist candidates are the winners if the median voter's ideal point is located in their credibility set and they apply the policy corresponding to the most centrist policy point allowed by their credibility sets. The optimal choice of the centrist candidate depends on the distribution of voters'ideal points. Under a uniform distribution of ideal points, for instance, where the median voter's ideal point is at the midpoint (C's interval), the centrist candidate can only win if his interval is four times as large as his opponents'. In this case, for a policy choice that is not too far from his two opponents'choices, that is, for a policy choice around the middle point, the centrist candidate is the winner. A necessary condition such that the centrist candidate wins is that the median voter's ideal point belongs to the interval of the centrist candidate.
For an arbitrary distribution of ideal points, when the ideal point of the median voter is in the interval of the centrist candidate, as it can be seen from the three examples given in Section 4.1 the winner can be any of the three candidates depending on the distribution of ideal points of voters. As the examples illustrate it might well happen that the centrist does not win even though his interval includes more than half of the voters.. First, the centrist candidate needs heavily concentrated ideal points of voters around the middle of the space. That is, a centrist candidate can only win if more than half of the voters' ideal points are 8 Duverger, 1964 p. 387 located only in his credibility set. For some distributions he even needs 60% or more of support in his credibility set. Secondly, some asymmetry in the distribution of ideal points gives the centrist candidate higher chances of winning. That is, for a skewed distribution where the median voter is located at a point to the left or right of the middle point but still only in the interval of the centrist candidate, a centrist candidate can win with a less concentrated distribution in his credibility set compared to a symmetric distribution 9 . In short, the centrist candidate needs a much higher amount of voters in his credibility set compared to his opponents in order to have a chance to win the election.
One point that should be taken into account is that I only analyzed symmetric intervals. It should not be di¢ cult to argue that, the conclusions would be almost identical under asymmetric intervals.
Of course, it should not be forgotten that this results are implied by plurality rule. Therefore, in order to see whether this disadvantage of a centrist candidate would also hold under another election rule, in the next section the same electoral competition as before will be analyzed under a run-o¤ rule. That is because the …rst round shows the true preferences of voters, i.e. the true support of parties, whereas in the second round some voters are forced to vote for their second best choice as their …rst choice might have been eliminated in the …rst round.
Restricted Electoral Competition With Three Candidates under a Run-O¤ Rule
We have seen that under an electoral competition where plurality rule is applied, the centrist candidate is disadvantaged compared to his opponents. Does a run-o¤ rule change this result? I analyze the results for voters which behave according to Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 (where it is applicable). Clearly, for a general distribution where the median voter´s ideal point is located in the interval of the leftist or 9 These results were obtained by considering di¤erent uni-modal Beta distributions.
rightist candidate, these candidates would win for sure in the …rst round with an absolute majority. Thus in run-o¤ there is no need for the second round.
If m is located at a point which belongs only to the centrist candidate's interval, the winner would depend on the characteristics of the distribution. 10 As in the previous sections, I consider a uniform distribution of ideal points.
I …rst analyze the case where a = b and assume a uniform distribution of ideal points of voters. In Proposition 5, I showed that for a < 1 6 , the centrist candidate wins for sure under a one round election system. So, for a < . So, none of the candidates can get more than half of the votes in the …rst round for any a.
i. Suppose that, C locates himself to the left of 1 2 . Then, in order to get to the second round he has to get more votes than L i.e.
should be satis…ed which holds for x C < 1 3a. If C locates himself to the right of 1 2 , then, in order to get to the second round he has at least to get more votes than R i.e. should be satis…ed which holds for x C > 3a. So, C should choose
1 a] to get to the second round. Clearly, it can only be satis…ed if a < 1 4 and these two intervals do not intersect for 1 6 a. Choosing x C = a or x C = 1 a, C would get in the second round the same amount of votes as his opponent (R and L respectively). Therefore, choosing
x C 2 (a; 1 3a) or x C 2 (3a; 1 a), C wins the second round for sure.
ii. If a = 1 4 , then a = 1 3a, so to have the chance to get to the second round after the tie-braking, C has to choose x C = ii. If iii. If Proof: Notice that x L = a and x R = 1 a are strictly dominant strategies for L and R respectively. So, none of the candidates can get more than half of the votes in the …rst round for any a for a similar reasoning as in Proposition 12.
should be satis…ed which holds for x C < 1 3a. If C locates himself to the right of 1 2 , then, in order to get to the second round he has to get more votes than R i.e. a; 1 a] , the leftist and rightist candidates win with equal probability. In all equilibria, x L = a and x R = 1 a.
Proof: Notice that x L = a and x R = 1 a are strictly dominant strategies for L and R respectively and C never chooses x C < a or x C > 1 a since he would get no votes for such a choice. So, none of the candidates can get more than half of the votes in the …rst round for any a. So, the analysis becomes the same as in Proposition 11. # Once again, under a run-o¤ rule the centrist candidate can win under a higher range of parameters compared to plurality rule. (for a < 1 6 under plurality and for a < 1 4 under run-o¤) As in the one-round case the parameter b plays no role. The only important parameter is a, the one de…ning the length of the intervals of the leftist and rightist candidates.
Finally, for a 1 2 , if Assumption 2 is maintained as it was done for the analysis of the one-round election, then the centrist candidate would continue to get no votes even under the run-o¤ system and the leftist and rightist candidates would tie twice.
Discussion of the Results
As it was done for electoral competition under plurality rule, in the analysis above the equilibrium outcomes are described for di¤erent credibility sets of candidates, which cover all the possibilities. In all cases, for leftist and rightist candidates, it is a strictly dominant strategy to choose the policy point that is the most centrist one of their credibility sets. Therefore, the choice of the centrist candidate is the result of the maximization of his utility taking these strictly dominant strategies into account.
The winner depends on the distribution of the voters' ideal points. If the median voter is located in their credibility sets, the leftist and rightist candidates win without the need for a second round as they obtain absolute majority in the …rst round. If the ideal point of the median voter is located in the credibility set of the centrist candidate then the winner depends on the characteristics of the distribution and the size of the credibility sets of each candidate.
In that case, given that neither the leftist nor the rightist candidate gets more than half of the votes in the …rst round, that is, given that they do not win the election already in the …rst round, for a centrist candidate it is su¢ cient to come second in the …rst round to win the election. The fact that the leftist or the rightist candidate does not get more than half of the votes in the …rst round implies that the ideal point of the median voter is located in the interval of the centrist candidate. So, it can easily be argued that if the centrist candidate quali…es for the second round he will for sure be closer to the ideal point of the median voter than his opponent in this round. This is true because if it weren't the case, that is, if his opponent in the second round is closer to the ideal point of the median voter, this opponent would already have acquired more than half of the votes in the …rst round.
A centrist candidate would also win for sure under run-o¤ rule for all parameter values for which he would win under plurality rule. Why is this true? If a centrist candidate wins under plurality rule for a given policy choice then he would also win the …rst round under the run-o¤ rule for the same policy choice as the equilibrium policy choice of the leftist and rightist candidates is the same under both rules.
We know that if a centrist candidate wins under plurality rule he is necessarily closer to the median voter compared to his two opponents. So, for the same policy choice he would win for sure the second round.
Then the question that arises is whether the centrist candidate would win for a higher parameter range.
For the plurality rule there exists a critical value of a beyond which the centrist candidate can never win.
Suppose we take an a slightly larger (a 0 = a + "). We know that the centrist candidate would win for sure if he gets to the second round. So, the only possibility that he does not win is that he becomes third for any policy choice in the …rst round. It can be shown that if a b, that the centrist candidate can still win under run-o¤ rule for " su¢ ciently small. On the other hand, if b > a, then if b is su¢ ciently large, it can be found examples for which the centrist candidate can never win if a is only slightly higher than the critical value So, we can conclude that the centrist candidate would (weakly) win for a larger set of parameter values under run-o¤ rule compared to plurality rule.
As before, I only analyzed symmetric intervals. It should not be di¢ cult to argue that, the conclusions would be almost identical under asymmetric intervals.
Conclusion
The model I have analyzed uses the credibility that voters assign to candidates to introduce restrictions on the candidates'strategies. I assume that exogenously given restrictions about the policy space specify the policy points that candidates can credibly propose. This limitation can prevent full convergence in terms of candidates'policy choices.
For two candidate competition, we obtain that the policy choices in equilibrium are di¤erent from the proposed by the median voter theorem, when the credibility of candidates prevents total convergence to the median voter.
For three candidate competition, the results imply that in many cases, although a majority of voters could be considered as ideologically centrist, centrist candidates have less chances of winning. This conclusion veri…es Duverger's statement mentioned before up to some point. It is not uniquely the plurality rule that leads to outcomes where only two candidates get a considerable amount of votes; credibility of candidates plays also an important role. Since candidates are assumed to be o¢ ce-motivated, leftist and rightist candidates have incentives to converge to each other as much as their intervals allow.
The centrist candidate prefers to be as close as possible to one of his opponents for more asymmetric distributions of ideal points of voters, whereas for symmetric distributions he prefers to be as far as possible from all his opponents. The centrist candidate is better-o¤ the larger is his interval and the smaller the interval of his opponents.
As it was discussed before, it can be said that the larger the interval of a candidate, the higher is his credibility. Therefore, whenever the intervals of the three candidates do not intersect, it can be concluded that as the credibility of a candidate increases, his probability of winning increases. A candidate with a larger interval would obtain higher share of votes; therefore as the credibility of a candidate increases, his utility also increases.
It can easily be argued that not only the distribution of voters but also the election rule determines the winner in the model analyzed in this paper. The model shows that leftist and rightist candidates would prefer a one-round electoral competition (plurality rule) whereas a centrist candidate would be better o¤ under a run-o¤ rule. That is, the election rule might help to obtain more centrist outcomes. Broadly speaking, the electoral competition in UK can be considered as a three party competition where plurality rule applies. As Taagepera and Shugart (1989) state British Liberals favored changes in the electoral rule which continues up today, as the plurality rule favors the two parties (Labor and Conservatives) on the left and right wings, whereas these two parties are quite happy with the system.
If the intervals of credible policies of the leftist and rightist candidates intersect, a centrist candidate cannot get any vote. Therefore, one should expect that in countries where leftist and rightist parties have high credibility, the electoral competition would take place between two parties. Centrist parties would arise when there is a policy interval that cannot be reached by any leftist or rightist party. The chance of winning of a centrist candidate would increase with the size of his interval and with a decrease in the size of the intervals of his opponents.
One important assumption maintained during the analysis is that there is no abstention. One further step would be discard this assumption and think that a voter would not vote for any candidate if they are too far away from his ideal point. In this case we could reach equilibria in which leftist and rightist candidates might diverge more than they do without abstention as they would have two con ‡icting incentives, namely, being close to the centrist candidate to "steal" some of his votes, and secondly not to loose rather radical voters.
With regard to the voters, I assume, moreover, that voters vote truthfully. The next step would be to allow voters to vote strategically. Under strategic voting, pre-election polls would play an important role to provide voters information about the distribution of ideal points and to coordinate themselves.
Under strategic voting with the aid of pre-election polls, I expect to verify Duverger's Law, that is I would obtain results where only the leftist and rightist candidates get a positive share of votes because voters whose most preferred candidate is the centrist one would prefer to vote for the less evil of the other two candidates if they expect that the centrist candidate has no chance of winning.
Appendix
Proposition 14: For 
